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Abstract 
 
Southern African cities are on the move. As elsewhere in the global south, populations are 
continuing to grow, shrink and transform in response to demographic and economic 
pressures (Crush et al. 2005; Potts 2009).  As the foundation of government, local authorities 
are on the frontlines of managing the transformations of their communities in ways that 
provide stability and economic opportunities. Through an examination of six South African 
municipalities and Gaborone, Botswana’s economic and political capital, this report helps us 
come to terms with local governments’ responses to population mobility. This research 
suggests that few authorities across Southern Africa are positioned to capitalise on 
migration’s counter-poverty potential. This is partly due to general difficulties of grappling 
with structural poverty and their expanded mandates. Authorities also face specific 
migration-related challenges: the availability and use of data; patterns of budgeting and 
popular participation; and political resistance to newcomers.  If addressed, these concerns 
would not only enable local authorities to respond more effectively to migration, but also to 
plan for economic development in a more strategic and sustained manner. This report 
provides a tool for assessing municipalities’ ability to respond and to help explain capacity 
variations. Our work identifies six primary indices for evaluating municipalities’ abilities and 
practices surrounding the management of human mobility and other population dynamics. 
Each of these includes a series of sub-measures for calculating aggregate and sub-area 
scores. While the measures outlined within are more indicative than exhaustive, they 
nonetheless allow for comparative analysis and point to areas for future interventions to 
improve local government strategies for poverty alleviation. 
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Introduction 
South African cities are on the move. As elsewhere in the global south, populations are 
continuing to grow, shrink and transform in response to demographic and economic 
pressures (Crush et al. 2005; Potts 2009). Although long more urbanised than many 
countries on the continent, almost two thirds (62.2 per cent) of South Africans now live in 
urban areas with a 1.4 per cent annual urbanisation rate. In Botswana the figures are similar, 
with 61.7 per cent urbanised but an urbanisation rate of 2.5 per cent (UNDESA 2011). Much 
of this growth is due to natural increase: longer life expectancies coupled with relatively high 
fertility rates. Yet some of the most dramatic changes in cities’ morphology, dependency 
ratios, and productive potential stem from people moving. Importantly, secondary cities and 
peri-urban areas are growing at the fastest rate, often quickly outstripping service and 
physical infrastructure and far outpacing growth in employment opportunities (see Roberts 
and Hohmann 2014). In 2013, the South African municipalities of Polokwane, Rustenburg, 
Vanderbijlpark, Nelspruit and Ekurhuleni were the five fastest-growing urban areas, with 
average annual population growth rates of between 1.6 per cent and 2.9 per cent over the 
last decade. Compare this with the country’s second city, Cape Town, which was growing 
over the same period at an annual rate of only 1.4 per cent.1 Even when human mobility 
does little to change absolute numbers, it remains an important dynamic with people 
frequently shifting within and between cities or between towns and more rural ‘homes’.  
 
There are always risks associated with moving, but when successful, mobility represents a 
route out of poverty for migrants, for kin and for sending communities. Given the scarcity of 
services and employment, moving towards economic and service nodes is often one of the 
most rapid and effective mechanisms for improving people’s welfare (White et al. 2008). 
Mobility of various forms can also contribute entrepreneurial energy, skills and labour in 
ways that benefit migrants and host communities. For sending communities, human mobility 
can decrease demands for services and promote investment through social and material 
remittances. Yet these opportunities are potentially countered by risks of resource and 
service scarcity, heightening inequality, declining labour productivity, social conflict and 
public health risks. Ensuring that the benefits outweigh these risks demands effective 
management and planning.  
 
As the foundation of government, local authorities are on the front lines of managing the 
transformations of their communities in ways that provide stability and economic 
opportunities. So while debates over migration’s specific drivers, dynamics and 
developmental consequences continue (see Bocquier 2005; Potts 2011; White and 
Lindstrom 2005), two messages are clear. First, mobility is a hallmark of the contemporary 
era, with the most socially and economically significant movements taking place within the 
global south, most usually within domestic borders. Second, if migration is to help counter 
poverty in sending and receiving communities, local governments at both ends of the 
migration process need to proactively respond to human mobility.  
 
The importance of local officials and institutions has been dramatically enhanced over the 
past two decades by a wave of decentralisation across the developing world (Crook 2003). 
Growing evidence suggests that while there have been significant benefits of 
                                                      
1 Figures from: http://www.southafrica.info/news/urbanisation-240113.htm#.U1lnPSib-ZY#ixzz2zpnPgb68. 
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decentralisation across sectors in many places, significant challenges remain and many 
authorities have largely failed to capitalise on the potential decentralisation presents. 
Among other factors, these shortcomings stem from conditions under which additional local 
government responsibilities are not supported by increased authority, technical and 
institutional capacity, or budgetary allocations. Underperformance is further exacerbated by 
unclear mandates, inter-governmental squabbling, and political incentives that often 
privilege ‘upward’ versus ‘downward’ accountability. These challenges can negatively affect 
all citizens as they work against all forms of planning and programme implementation. This is 
particularly likely to compromise long-term initiatives to help the poor and other 
marginalised groups who are ill-positioned to make demands on local or national authorities.  
 
Through an examination of six South African municipalities and Gaborone, Botswana’s 
economic and political capital, this report helps us come to terms with local government’s 
responses to population mobility. As this and previous research suggest, few authorities 
across Southern Africa are positioned to capitalise on migration’s counter-poverty potential 
(see Landau et al. 2013). Part of this is due to general challenges facing local authorities as 
they grapple with structural poverty and their expanded mandates. Amidst these general 
challenges, there are identifiable factors that work against planning for mobility. If 
addressed, these concerns would not only enable local authorities to respond more 
effectively to migration, but also to plan for economic development in a more strategic and 
sustained manner. Understanding the factors working against effective responses helps us 
go beyond normative appeals and political calls for improved governance by providing 
practical guidance for advocates, those providing technical assistance and local authorities 
themselves.  
 
The research underlying this report was supported through the Migrating out of Poverty 
Research Consortium coordinated by the University of Sussex, with support from the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development. It builds on preliminary research 
sponsored by the Programme to Support Pro-poor Policy Development (PSPPD) based in the 
President’s office of the Republic of South Africa. The recent phase of fieldwork was carried 
out in both South Africa and Botswana. The South African case studies, Lephalale and 
Bushbuckridge, was conducted by researchers from the African Centre for Migration & 
Society (ACMS) at Wits University in Johannesburg. The Botswana component was led by the 
University of Botswana. The following synthesis represents the views and perspectives only 
of the authors and the African Centre for Migration & Society.  
 
Key Findings  
 
The capacity and activities of municipal governments varied tremendously among the seven 
sites included in this study. At one end of the spectrum was Botswana’s capital, Gaborone. 
As the host to the country’s relatively well functioning national administration, Botswana’s 
national capital is the focus of an extensive municipal structure with a relatively 
sophisticated planning department (see Maphunye 2009). Within South Africa, the wealthier 
Mossel Bay was much smaller, but similarly organised albeit within a less conducive political 
structure. Oddly, Pretoria – South Africa’s political capital – exhibited a dearth of planning 
capacity due to a dramatic purging of positions associated with population planning during 
the post-apartheid transition. At the other end of the spectrum was Bushbuckridge, where 
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one person is responsible for research, planning, and local development, but whose work 
was on hold at the time of research as the municipality had been put under provincial 
administration. Lephalale was a middle ground in terms of government’s role and capacity. 
The municipality had been designed to serve a small agrarian town, and could do so 
relatively effectively. However, from 2006, a large swath of nearby villages had been 
incorporated into the municipality in ways that greatly increased the area the municipality 
served. Soon after came an influx in private sector actors and job seekers linked to the 
power station construction (according to Statistics South Africa, it has had an annual growth 
rate of 3.06 per cent from 2001-2011. Almost all of that growth was in the last five years).2 
As a result, a relatively effective municipality was being pushed to its limits, at times finding 
creative ways of boosting its capacity, such as developing a liaison committee with mining 
companies. At other times it was evidently overstretched and unable to cope. 
 
Rather than provide a summary of each of the seven case studies, this report provides a tool 
for assessing municipalities’ ability to respond and to help explain capacity variations. Our 
work identifies six primary indices for evaluating municipalities’ abilities and practices 
surrounding the management of human mobility and other population dynamics. Each of 
these includes a series of sub-measures for calculating aggregate and sub-area scores. While 
the measures outlined below are indicative more than exhaustive, they nonetheless allow 
for comparative analysis and point to areas for future interventions.  
 
The six primary indices are:  
 
 Perceptions and attitudes among municipal officials regarding human mobility and 
their ability and responsibility for addressing its varied forms. 
 Data collection and management systems. 
 Budgeting systems’ responsiveness to demographic change. 
 Popular engagement and participatory mechanisms. 
 The inclusion of ‘migrant interests’ in political and bureaucratic accountability and 
incentives. 
 The degree to which approaches to human security and social cohesion appropriately 
consider human mobility. 
 
Using these six categories as an assessment guide, it is possible to evaluate the degree to 
which local government is responding to mobility affecting a given municipality and many of 
the reasons enabling or discouraging proactive, progressive responses. These measures have 
been designed to guide comparative, qualitative analysis. Through application and further 
research they may be refined for more specific administrative or political contexts. 
 
Although imprecise in their measures, each of these areas can be scored according to 
indicators introduced below. A fictional municipality responding fully to mobility in ways that 
capitalise on its potential for economic development would score highest marks across all six 
indices. Such a (fictitious) finding is represented below as Figure 1. This ideal is unlikely to be 
achieved anywhere, let alone in the kinds of communities considered here. Nonetheless, it 
                                                      
2 See: http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=993&id=lephalale-municipality.  
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offers an analytical and normative framework with which to assess a wide variety of 
municipalities. 
 
Figure 1: A Fully Capacitated Municipality 
 
A more realistic (yet still hypothetical) version of a municipality appears in in Figure 2, below. 
In this somewhat more probable scenario, a municipality has some systems in place, but falls 
short elsewhere. Moreover, it points to where internal and external actors may wish to 
intervene. In this case, it appears as though officials recognise their role in addressing 
mobility but may be hamstrung by a range of other factors including budgeting, data, and 
forms of popular participation. Even if there is no single recipe for addressing these 
shortcomings – and every country and municipality will require tailor-made assistance – this 
framework provides a normative guide for municipalities and advocates while allowing for 
comparison across space and time. 
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Figure 2: A Partially Capacitated Municipality
 
Case Selection, Questions and Data Collection 
 
Migration affects almost all communities in highly mobile regions such as Southern Africa. 
Whether due to people leaving, transiting or settling – however temporarily – their 
movements potentially shift trade patterns, political authority, and social membership. 
Recognising that mobility is all but universal, this research nonetheless represents work in a 
limited number of municipalities selected during two phases. In the initial phase (2009-
2010), the research team visited four municipalities in South Africa alone: Mossel Bay, 
Tshwane (formerly Pretoria), Nelson Mandela Bay (formerly Port Elizabeth), and Merafong. 
For reasons detailed in previous reports, these municipalities were selected to represent a 
geographic spread, varied party leadership structures, relative wealth, and the incidents of 
‘xenophobic’ attacks. While there were variations on these criteria, all four of the 
municipalities had remarkably high levels of in-migration. During the second phase (2013-
2014), we targeted three additional municipalities. These were chosen to expand our 
geographic spread and include examples of sites grappling with specific migration forms, 
including high levels of out-migration. They also demonstrated a recognition of the fact that 
secondary cities remain understudied in Southern Africa and are affected variably by 
migration. The inclusion of Gaborone allowed us to extend the research beyond South 
Africa’s borders.  
 
In Phase II, the first municipality, Gaborone, was chosen because it was the capital of 
Botswana and a destination for migrants from across the country and neighbouring states, 
particularly Zimbabwe (see Campbell and Crush 2012). Although its population is modest in 
absolute terms – 231,626 based on the 2011 census – its residents nonetheless represent 
about 10 per cent of the country’s total population. It is a relatively new city, built only in the 
1960s for the newly independent country. Its founders naively expected it would originally 
house only 20,000 people and would grow no larger than 60,000-70,000. Although the 
country relies heavily on exports of diamonds and beef – industries taking place largely 
beyond Gaborone – the city has an active financial services sector and hosts a broad array of 
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public services, commercial enterprises, government departments, and international 
organisations. Moreover, located close to the border with South Africa, it is both a 
destination and a transit point for migrants from across the country and elsewhere in the 
region (most notably the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe). Not surprisingly, its 
growth rate of 3.4 per cent is the highest in the country (Central Statistics Office 2005). 
Perhaps because of its small size, relative wealth and impressive political stability, Botswana 
remains particularly understudied in both the development governance and contemporary 
migration literature. While it has a different history, public administration, and political 
characteristics from towns in South Africa, it also shares some demographic and geographic 
characteristics with South African secondary cities and illustrates the relevance of these 
research themes across multiple countries.  
 
Within South Africa, we chose two additional case studies specifically for their unique 
migration dynamics. The first, Bushbuckridge, has long been affected by regional migration. 
Known primarily as a sending community, as a former homeland (i.e. Bantustan), much of 
the labour force historically went to the mines around Rustenburg in search of work, and 
these linkages and mobility patterns continue today. Furthermore, traditional leaders remain 
important sources of authority in the area, having the legal right to allocate land. They work 
closely with the municipality on many aspects of their work, including disbursing social 
grants, resolving disputes, and consulting with community members. It is a community with 
a high dependency ratio and a skewed sex balance with disproportionally high numbers of 
women, as well as very high rates of unemployment. These characteristics drive much of the 
municipality’s planning and community engagement. They also imply certain limitations on 
the work of the municipality, for example, through a lack of tax base. Somewhat oddly, even 
as it sends its residents elsewhere it receives significant numbers of migrants from 
neighbouring countries. The area has a particular history of migration with Mozambique, 
which established patterns of migration during South Africa’s liberation struggle and the civil 
war in Mozambique (1977-1992). These ties have remained strong, with many 
Bushbuckridge residents maintaining active family ties across the Mozambique border. 
Mobility remains an important empirical factor and a critical aspect of political discourse in 
the municipality, with key political issues including the issuing of South African identity 
documents to second generation undocumented Mozambican migrants, planning for 
remittances of migrant workers, and access to land by new arrivals (see Polzer 2008). In 
Bushbuckridge, there can be few doubts of mobility’s role in shaping the tasks facing the 
municipality.  
 
The final case was Lephalale, a small town located near the Botswana border in South Africa. 
Although unexceptional until half a decade ago, it is now distinguished by an exceptional 
rate of population growth due almost entirely to in-migration. Until recently, Lephalale was a 
sleepy agricultural outpost with a small coal mine forming the backbone of the local 
economy. After discovering that the municipality sits atop of one of the world’s largest coal 
reserves, South Africa designated it as a site for one of the world’s largest coal mines and a 
new, massive coal fired power stations (see Faku 2013). At the time of the 2013 fieldwork, 
construction was in full swing with workers from South Africa and across the globe with 
specialised skills, as well as private sector corporations in the construction and energy 
sectors. The municipality envisages a transformation of the town into an urban area in a 
short space of time. However, the planning challenges of this kind of transformation are 
11 
 
tremendous. Lephalale is an example of a municipality that is particularly affected by 
mobility, but also proactively engaging with migration as a force that is actively shaping the 
community, and as a driver of change.  
 
In each municipality, we aimed to answer three key questions that would lead us to a better 
understanding of how mobility was shaping local economic development, and what local 
authorities needed to respond to it effectively: 
 
1. Who are the local authorities in the municipality, and how do they understand and 
respond to demographic changes?  
2. What are the key migration dynamics, and how are they shaping the municipality?  
3. What does this mean for planning, service delivery, and human development?  
 
Our comparative answers to these questions allowed us to make relevant recommendations 
on how municipalities can take mobility into consideration to build a vibrant, democratic 
community.  
  
The first phase of data collection was conducted between March and June 2010 by a team of 
researchers. The limited research period meant that the team spent approximately two 
weeks in each municipality. Given time limits, we placed emphasis on attitudes and accounts 
of practice rather than deep observation of institutional culture, population dynamics, or 
political configurations. At each site, a four-person research team conducted individual and 
focus group interviews with representatives of the police, municipal government, political 
parties, unions, community organisations and the private sector. Where possible, the team 
verified claims through secondary data analysis or interviews, but the emphasis remains 
firmly on institutional practice and assumptions rather than concrete consequences and 
impact evaluation. As our intention is largely to highlight concerns for further research and 
policy intervention, even our modest findings can provide the basis for additional research, 
which will confirm the relative importance and impacts of the themes discussed in the 
remaining pages. 
 
Phase II of the data collection lasted through much of 2013, with two months of fieldwork in 
each municipality. Research partners helped to arrange introductions to the municipality, 
including meetings with the municipal managers in all three localities. Although we had 
hoped to secure full cooperation from local officials, there was initially some degree of 
hostility to the research. Over the course of our inquiries we came to recognise the degree 
to which officials wished to shroud many of their municipalities’ management shortcomings. 
Nonetheless, we continued with an initial scoping visit, which led to a mapping of the 
community and main stakeholders. From this, we developed a list of key stakeholders and 
arranged interviews accordingly. Specific interview guides were drawn up for each 
respondent, based on their knowledge of the community. In spite of guidelines and goals 
drawn up for each interview, interviews were largely open ended, to be flexible enough to 
adapt to the knowledge of the respondent. Generally, the focus remained similar to that 
informing Phase I.  
 
The Importance of Local Government in Botswana and South Africa  
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The nature of decentralisation across much of Africa creates a sometime unresolvable 
tension in developing appropriate responses to human mobility. Theoretically, 
decentralisation in both Botswana and South Africa was to help ensure that democratic 
structures reached communities, particularly in rural areas (Wunsch 1998). As a result, local 
government structures in both countries are now largely responsible for critical portfolios 
ranging from disaster management to service provision. But while this places local 
government at the forefront of shaping economic development in communities, local 
governments often lack the resources, skills and political support to deliver on these 
promises. 
 
While immigration and urbanisation are international phenomenon demanding national 
policy frameworks, the effects of human movements are highly spatialised, with the most 
dramatic effects taking place at the local level. People move from and into specific sites 
where the impacts will be felt most. The formal strengthening of municipal authorities 
across much of the developing world means that local governments should hypothetically be 
empowered to capitalise on the opportunities and mediate against the challenges such 
movements present. Failing to do so, or responding inappropriately, will only help realise 
urban planners’ Malthusian fears of expanding poverty, public health crises and conflict.  
  
Local leadership and engagement are the first steps to developing effective, pro-poor 
responses to human mobility. But an acceptance of responsibility will accomplish little unless 
local government planners are adequately informed, resourced and supported by 
bureaucratic capacity and political superiors. Although by no means guaranteed, larger 
municipalities are more likely to leverage the skills and resources to fashion such a response. 
However, growth is fastest among towns and peri-urban settlements and it is the relatively 
under-resourced administrations that need the greatest assistance in responding to 
movements into and through their jurisdictions. Small towns or rural communities, which 
are often the source of migration, are often similarly disadvantaged. This puts local 
government in a challenging position of managing current crises associated with socio-
economic and ethnic diversity while planning for future populations and broader 
development initiatives. This research aims to help address this gap.  
 
A Framework for Comparing Municipal Responsiveness 
 
Our research documents a continuum of capacity in responding to mobility. Unsurprisingly, 
there are strong correlations between generally high levels of service delivery and security 
with more proactive responses to human mobility; well managed cities are those also best 
able to manage migration. These municipalities have the resources and capacity to function 
effectively, and recognise migration as an important element in responding to the 
community’s population dynamics. However, even with such recognition, there are still 
obstacles linked to data quality, and participation and budgeting processes. In this scenario, 
a municipality can score well on all of our indices except those where they are hampered by 
institutional structures that limit their local responsiveness. These include centralised party 
systems and control over financial resources. Although these factors cannot be addressed 
solely at the municipal level, it is nonetheless important to analytically incorporate them for 
programming and advocacy purposes.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, we found that municipal authorities with limited capacity 
for planning even the most basic elements of service delivery are typically unable to respond 
effectively to population dynamics. Such shortcomings are rarely only administrative in 
nature, but are driven by political factions that often immobilise the municipality. Using the 
indices outlined in greater detail below, these municipalities would score poorly on all 
fronts. Represented graphically, almost none of their stars’ arms would be coloured.  
 
Importantly, there are significant variations both within the municipalities that were 
responding relatively well and among those who were not. It is not enough to simply say a 
municipality is or is not developing an effective pro-poor response to migration. For one, 
even where responses are relatively strong, they can always be improved. And where 
municipalities are not doing well, it is critical to understand the primary obstacle(s) to 
developing an effective response. The following section provides more details on the 
primary indices and predictors of success first outlined in the introduction. Each of the 
primary indices includes the sub-components (reiterated below) that can be individually 
assessed and aggregated to develop both an overall and a metric specific representation of 
the municipality.  
 
 Perceptions and attitudes among municipal officials regarding human mobility and 
their ability and responsibility for addressing its varied forms. 
 Data collection and management systems. 
 
 Budgeting systems’ responsiveness to demographic change. 
 Popular engagement and participatory mechanisms.  
 The inclusion of ‘migrant interests’ in political and bureaucratic accountability and 
incentives.  
 The degree to which approaches to human security and social cohesion 
appropriately consider human mobility. 
 
Perceptions, Attitudes, Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Across the case studies, officials continue to react to foreign and domestic migrants by 
implicitly denying their presence, excluding them from developmental plans, or tacitly 
condoning discrimination throughout the government bureaucracy and police. In almost all 
instances, migrants (domestic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and all legal residents) are 
members of the community entitled to government resources (Götz 2003). In many cases, 
government officials see them as an illegitimate drain on public resources. As such, it is all 
too common at the municipal level for relations to be strained between the political and 
administrative arms of government. In some municipalities, there is a distinct sense that 
current residents or ‘ratepayers’ deserve to be privileged over new arrivals or temporary 
residents. In others, officials hold fast to the idea that migration worsens violent crime, 
disease, and unemployment. Still, others insist that matters related to migration and human 
mobility fall exclusively within the national government’s bailiwick. These perceptions place 
migrants outside of the local government constituency, preventing officials from adopting 
pragmatic policies to address their developmental impact and provide for their needs.  
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Staffing, transitions, and coordination within municipalities have also limited local 
authorities’ ability to develop appropriate frameworks. In some municipalities, leadership 
and staff turnovers have resulted in the redeployment of staff into positions where they do 
not have adequate technical background or knowledge to manage migration and 
urbanisation. The rapid turnover within some municipalities has also resulted in the loss of 
institutional knowledge that could provide important insights into municipal population 
dynamics. Perhaps most critically, different departments or divisions within local 
government often disagree over the validity of data or ongoing population dynamics. Often 
these disagreements are tied to broader concerns about performance targets and 
evaluation. Consequently, even where relatively accurate data exist, they may be selectively 
ignored by officials. 
  
While Gaborone possibly had greater scope for improved coordination given that it houses 
both municipal and national authorities, there was little evidence that such coordination 
occurred. Indeed, Campbell (2014) notes that:  
 
There is also strong evidence that failures of interdepartmental coordination further 
inhibits an effective response to mobility relates and generates poor institutional 
coherence. Given that mobility is an interdepartmental issue impacting on every arena, 
strong coordination mechanisms are essential. But for this to occur, there would need 
to be a reconsideration of a range of policies – health, security, education, trade, 
infrastructure development, etc. – to ensure a greater degree of policy coherence. 
 
Due in part to the challenges local government faces in some areas in establishing 
themselves as a legitimate authority in various arenas, many municipalities find that there 
are overlapping nodes of power at the local level. Therefore, coordination becomes not just 
an intra-governmental problem, between and among different municipal and sectoral 
structures, but between the state and traditional leaders, private sector actors, and others 
 
Indicators on perceptions, attitudes, roles and responsibilities: 
  
One of the mote critical steps for municipalities to take in addressing mobility is to take 
ownership of the issue. This dimension explores the extent to which municipal officials are 
prepared to address migration, see it as their responsibility, and understand how human 
mobility falls within their specific mandate: 
  
 Do municipal officials recognise their responsibilities to plan for mobility within, into 
and from their respective geographic area? 
 Can municipal officials identify the formal and informal roles and responsibilities of 
various role players in local government vis-à-vis migration? 
 Can municipal officials identify the formal and informal roles and responsibilities of 
various role players outside of local government and how these responsibilities may 
impact on their mandates? 
 Do local officials prioritise the needs of taxpayers or long-term residents or specific 
‘indigenous’ ethnic groups over other current or future residents? 
 Can municipal officials identify and articulate the links between varied forms of 
human migration, security, economic development and counter-poverty initiatives? 
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Data Collection and Management 
 
Mobility researchers in Southern Africa are often frustrated by limited data availability and 
poor data quality when it does exist. South Africa and Botswana have more sophisticated 
data collection structures in place than many countries in the region, but data linked to 
mobility nonetheless remains weak. Even the South African national statistical agency 
(Statistics South Africa or StatsSA) recognises that national data on migration is: 
 
[…] generally scanty, patchy and skewed. Such shortcomings tend to negatively 
influence policies, debates, dialogues, etc. as well as distort communication about 
migration. This contributes to anti-migrant sentiments that could lead to harmful 
stereotyping, discrimination and even xenophobia.3  
 
Similarly, in Botswana ‘[a]t the most basic level, demographic data is not available or 
sufficiently nuanced to provide the basis for urban planning. Yet it is not data paucities alone 
that are at issue. Rather, it is political and institutional structures that work most strong 
against forward looking planning’ (Campbell 2014). 
  
Another common theme across municipalities was the challenge of data collection and 
management. Disaggregated census data were not being used in a single municipality 
studied, for reasons ranging from a lack of awareness of capacity to access it, to questioning 
the validity or relevance of the data. While a few municipalities used other sources of data 
for planning, there was generally a lack of consistency and quality of data being used by 
municipalities.  
 
Key indicators on data collection and management: 
 
Responding effectively to demographic changes requires, first and foremost, the availability 
of current a reliable data, and the ability within the municipality to use it effectively. Key 
measures around data collection and management include: 
 
 Are spatialised data available that allow for population projections at the sub-
municipal, municipal, and national levels? Do these allow analysts to disaggregate on 
the basis of key socio-economic variables including migration status? 
 Is there agreement within the municipality and within the national bureaucracy on 
what constitutes reliable data sources for planning purposes? 
 Do municipal officials have the skills to analyse available data or are they able to call 
on these skills from other places in the public administration? 
 Are there political or financial incentives for accurately collecting and incorporating 
data into policy making and programmatic planning?  
 Are available data or empirically informed estimates used for budgeting and planning 
at the local and national levels? 
                                                      
3 Cited in : https://africacheck.org/reports/how-many-zimbabweans-live-in-south-africa-the-numbers-are-
unreliable/ See also  Budlender 2013.  
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Budgeting Systems’ Responsiveness to Demographic Change 
 
While municipalities across the region have a limited revenue raising mandate, most of their 
resources stem from inter-government transfers, usually from the national treasury. Across 
much of the world, decentralisation initiatives have fallen short of their potential due to the 
ineffectiveness of such transfers. Indeed, with little leverage over the central government 
and party systems and potentially limited capacity to manage funds, municipalities often 
struggle to mobilise the resources needed to fulfil their service delivery, security, and 
infrastructure development mandates.  
  
Even when financial resources are available, there are no guarantees that they will be used 
in ways that are productive or pro-poor. Resources are often ‘captured’ by the political and 
economic elite and directed into areas where they serve the interests of the already 
relatively well-endowed. This is due in part to those groups’ ability to mobilise politically 
along with close kin, class or professional connections to decision makers. Even where 
resources are dedicated to poorer areas, their allocations may adhere more to political logics 
than principles of social justice or poverty alleviation.  
  
Budgeting for human mobility adds an additional dimension to the already complex process 
of local and inter-governmental resource allocation. Effectively planning for population 
growth requires investments in people who may not yet be present or in areas that have yet 
to be occupied. That it may also mean allocating resources to services that will only be fully 
utilised in the future demands compromises on expenditures for current residents. Where 
current populations have acute needs, this is often difficult to sell politically. In areas of out-
migration, municipalities have a somewhat different challenge as they must provide services 
and infrastructure without the presence of many of their most productive residents. In such 
sites, dependency ratios are often disproportionately high, creating elevated demands on 
clinics and schools whilst generating little local revenue. Remittances may help address 
families’ needs, but they are private funds and unlikely to support public goods or services.  
 
Indicators on an effective budgeting process: 
 
In all instances, effective budgeting for human mobility requires: (a) strong assessments of 
population and economic trends; (b) spatialised analysis of these trends’ implications for 
public expenditures; and (c) incentives and mechanisms for allocating national or local 
resources to meet current needs while preparing future residential patterns and economic 
strategies. These are difficult criteria to meet, all the more so during periods of rapid 
economic or political transformation. With this in mind, indicators of an effective budgeting 
process include: 
 
 Do budgetary authorities at the municipal level use accurate and forward looking 
data on settlement patterns and economic activities to plan resource allocations and 
inter-governmental transfers? 
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 Do budgetary authorities at the provincial or national level use accurate and forward 
looking data on settlement patterns and economic activities to plan resource 
allocations and inter-governmental transfers? 
 Are there mechanisms which allow resource allocation and inter-governmental 
transfers to be reconsidered in light of dramatic changes in settlement patterns? 
 Are an adequate proportion of municipal resources allocated to investing to prepare 
for future population patterns (work and settlement)? 
 Are an adequate proportion of public resources dedicated to meeting the needs of 
economically marginalised populations including recent migrants? 
 
Popular Engagement and Mechanisms of Participation 
  
Participatory planning emerged in the post-independence and post-apartheid periods as 
means of realising democratic transformation at the local level (see Botes and van Rensburg 
2000). Although more pronounced in South Africa than in Botswana, varied forms of 
participation are nonetheless employed to help set the course for municipalities towards 
common development goals. In Gaborone, these tend to be organised by the national 
government. In South Africa, the municipalities have greater latitude in determining 
priorities. While laudable on many grounds, the emphasis on participatory planning is not 
without its drawbacks. At the general level, people’s self-assessments of their public service 
needs are rarely balanced by objective empirical evidence. This is not to belittle local or 
personal knowledge, but often participants lack technical knowledge (around sanitation and 
public health for example) or may be subject to political pressure or influence. Regardless, 
the needs expressed through consultation are then aggregated and filtered in ways designed 
to meet political imperatives and capacities.  
  
It is also worth noting that migrants are often de facto excluded from popular participation 
and planning processes. Part of this is due simply to the fact that they may not yet be at the 
sites where assessments take place. For circular or oscillating migrants, they may also be 
absent when meetings occur. In other instances, people intending to move elsewhere may 
not make the effort to invest in public participation even when they would benefit from 
(and certainly plan to use) public services. Beyond that, our research found that even where 
there were no overt prohibitions on migrant participation, foreigners and recent migrants 
rarely participated.  
  
For the reasons described above, what is ultimately reflected in popularly determined 
planning and budgeting documents consequently represents the needs of only those 
sections of the poor population that accessed consultation forums at one specific moment in 
time. In addition, this limited array of needs is articulated in terms of the political interests 
and priorities of office bearers. Moreover, communities rarely have the capacity to project 
demographic trends, and are unlikely to ask municipalities to dedicate resources to potential 
future residents over their own acute sense of immediate need. Given public attitudes 
towards migrants, and a limited knowledge of migration dynamics, officials are unlikely to 
insist that resources be dedicated to an unpopular group of potential residents. This can 
result in what might be termed ‘backward-looking programming,’ a situation in which 
planning represents the prior needs of the specific section of the current poor population 
that has accessed consultation forums. 
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Part of the concern with participation is conceptual muddiness over what it means to be a 
‘resident’ somewhere. Many homeowners in Bushbuckridge, for example, who could play an 
important political and economic role in the community, live and work in Gauteng, and 
rarely return to Bushbuckridge in practice. This clearly impacts on their engagement with 
municipality structures. The converse is Lephalale, where many people have come in search 
of work, but have another ‘home’ in which they hope to invest. The implications this has for 
service provision are substantial. The housing needs of each place, for example, are 
significantly different. As is the way people could be expected to access health care, or 
education. In Gaborone, these demographic realities and their implications were discussed 
within municipalities, but not fully brought into planning processes.  
 
Indicators on popular engagement and participation: 
 
Although general levels of political participation and representation are important in 
combating poverty, the following indicators point to particular aspects of participation that 
can work for or against planning for human mobility: 
 
 Are public participation mechanisms designed in ways that can reach the politically 
and economically marginal populations including recent migrants?  
 Do participatory budgeting and planning processes leave space for technocrats or 
others within government to allocate resources to under-represented or absent 
groups such as migrants? 
 Are there groups that have ‘captured’ public participation processes to the exclusion 
of other among the poor? (A ‘no’ answer is a positive outcome in this regard).  
 
 Has the municipality designed special programmes to assess the needs and interests 
of those who for reasons of vulnerability, stigma or fear may choose not to 
participate in public meetings? 
 Are there mechanisms to assess the interests of migrants who have moved out of 
communities so as to encourage future investment? 
 
Political Accountability and Incentives 
 
Bureaucrats and politicians are rational actors whose actions reflect the interplay between 
their interests and the perceived opportunities and limitations they face. Infrastructure 
investments in one area, for example, may be a white elephant when it comes to long term 
collective benefit, but it may nonetheless provide politicians with tremendous rewards in 
terms of mobilising their constituency, pleasing party superiors, or securing kickbacks. In 
highly centralised bureaucratic or party systems, accountability tends to run ‘upward’ or 
towards the centre (see Curtis et al. 2005; Snyder 1999). Party lists over directly elected 
representation will only enforce this tendency. Where the citizenry is empowered and 
active, they are more likely to encourage forms of ‘downward’ accountability. However, 
even then certain groups – based on gender, nationality, wealth, location, ethnicity, or other 
factors –are more likely to have influence, unless there are specific mechanisms to counter 
capture. More innocently, performance management systems within the bureaucracy can 
incentivise people to invest their time, energies, and other resources in achieving particular 
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targets at the cost of others. As illustration, South African housing policy has focused largely 
on delivering a particular number of houses rather than on providing suitable housing in 
economically viable areas (see Bond and Tait 1997). This has resulted in large, government 
funded housing developments in areas where people struggle to find work: they may have a 
house but no livelihood. Shifting service delivery goalposts or the lack of necessary financial 
support may also encourage municipal officials to underperform or build systems which 
disguise failures.  
  
Political accountability within municipalities and between municipalities and other branches 
of government regularly surfaced as a disincentive for addressing human mobility and other 
planning issues. In a number of the cases, municipalities were paralysed by political 
contestation as party infighting or ethnic-conflict prevents cooperation within and between 
departments. Even in those municipalities firmly controlled by a strong central leadership, 
there were often questions about who was responsible for planning on a number of critical 
issues. This provided significant opportunities for shirking when it came to planning and the 
decision making relevant to it. It also opened space for political capture, particularly where 
it was related to resource allocation. In both countries, resource use, decision making, and 
allocation are strongly linked to political structures, which include provincial and national 
linkages. There is a degree of impunity, particularly at the municipal level, which has actually 
incentivised ambiguity.  
  
For the reasons suggested above, municipal officials and politicians are only likely to plan for 
migration – to use data appropriately, to engage with migrant populations and to consider 
the implications of human mobility – where they have reasons to do so. Although the 
popular participation of migrant groups may, as noted, help to shape pro-migrant behaviour, 
this will rarely be enough.  
 
Key indicators on political accountability and incentives: 
 
Recent efforts to strengthen local government structures have been made in order to 
strengthen downward accountability and improve bureaucratic performance. However, 
there are mixed analyses on the extent to which this has been successful. Indicators for 
political and bureaucratic accountability include:  
 
 Is planning for human mobility explicitly included in planners’ key performance 
areas? Phrased another way, must plans or programmes explicitly consider their 
viability and impact vis-à-vis population dynamics? 
 Do service delivery targets focus on numbers served or on reaching poor and 
marginalised community members? If yes, are international and domestic migrants 
considered as marginalised community members? 
 Does the party or resource allocation system within the public administration 
encourage upwards or downwards accountability?  
 Are data available and used to track performance and service delivery to 
marginalised groups including migrants? Alternatively, are officials and bureaucrats 
able to ignore or suppress data that points to underperformance? 
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 Is there adequate cooperation within or between government departments to focus 
on the delivery of public goods, or are officials and bureaucrats instead concentrating 
on political positioning and advancement? 
 
Social Cohesion and Security 
 
Human mobility raises the spectre of intergroup conflict and discrimination. If managed 
poorly, this can result in violence or overt persecution and exclusion in ways that further 
marginalise the poor and hinder efforts the asset accumulation necessary to counter 
poverty. Where managed well by the municipality and social institutions, groups with 
remarkably different socio-cultural backgrounds may create diverse and convivial spaces in 
which to pursue their individual and family goals.  
  
The first step in addressing migration-related tensions and the possibility of violence is to 
identify and address the roots of conflict and discrimination. Throughout our research, 
many officials understood managing or addressing migration as something primarily 
associated with international movements. As such, its consequences for social cohesion are 
typically deemed a national competence. Rarely do municipal officials overtly consider the 
needs to manage the diversity associated with domestic mobility or take responsibility for it, 
although the need to do so is clearly outlined in the global literature (see Andrew 2007; 
Schiller 2013). Rather, local government officials typically downplay the significance of 
discriminatory attitudes as enablers for other forms of conflict. Apart from regularly denying 
responsibility for managing it, municipal authorities are often largely ignorant of what 
produces conflict or cohesion in diverse populations.  
  
While officials and police officers vary in the degree to which they explicitly link migration 
and insecurity, many continue to link unregulated population movement and settlement to 
the crime within their communities. If it is not migrants, per se, that are the problem, it is 
uncontrolled housing and settlement patterns, the inability to organise and register the 
population, and the inability of the city to keep up with the infrastructure needed to reach 
into townships and informal settlements. Some cite the poor quality of education and 
limited opportunities for schooling as an indirect cause of conflict and criminality. As almost 
all of these factors are linked to population dynamics, migration remains a spectre hiding 
just beneath the surface. What few officials seem to explicitly recognise is that the negative 
outcomes they observe are by no means predetermined. Rather, the ineffective 
management of population growth has helped heighten precisely the tensions over housing 
and resources that can lead to intergroup conflict.  
  
Across the two phases of research, we were repeatedly impressed by how little officials have 
done to manage the tensions and insecurity associated with population mobility. There are 
good reasons to do so as we also observe a range of practices by the police and others that 
suggest a strong bias against new arrivals. In many municipalities, the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) has arrested and detained non-nationals and other suspect outsiders. Under 
the guise of crime control, the police in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and a number of other 
municipalities, spend disproportionate amounts of their time tracking undocumented 
migrants (Vigneswaran and Duponchel 2009). Even where SAPS is not directly involved, 
someone often steps in to carry out the same function. Botswana also has a longstanding 
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history of xenophobia, with recorded incidents when it was still a colony. Campbell (2014) 
attributes the origins of xenophobia in Botswana to economic and religious factors 
associated with the British government and European churches in the early colonial period. 
The fact that Botswana is relatively prosperous, stable and ethnically homogenous havs also 
undoubtedly contributed to anxiety about immigration from their poorer and more 
fractured neighbours. 
 
Key indicators of human security and social cohesion: 
 
Mobility changes the composition of communities, and municipalities are at the forefront of 
defining how government encourages inclusive community building.  
 
 Does the municipality (or key municipal officials) accept that they have a 
responsibility for promoting conviviality among residents? 
 Do municipal officials demonstrate understandings of the potential sources of 
conflict or cohesion within or outside of an official policy promoting inclusivity?  
 Are there explicit, empirically informed and mainstreamed plans of action in place to 
support diverse community needs and have these concerns been mainstreamed into 
service delivery mechanisms across sectors? 
 Are residents, regardless of origin or ethnicity, able to access police protection to the 
same degree or do police regularly harass those they perceive to be outsiders? 
 Are there institutional structures and incentives that discriminate on the basis of 
origins or period of residence? 
 
Applying the Municipal Measurement Tool for Mobility Response 
 
To demonstrate these indices’ potential utility, we apply them to the two South African case 
studies included in Phase II of the research. As promised earlier in the document, doing so 
both illustrates how municipal responsiveness can be rated for comparative purposes and 
identifies the specific areas most in need of intervention.  
Looking at the responses to the indicators in each category, it is clear that neither 
Bushbuckridge nor Lephalale are well equipped to address mobility. However, the reasons 
differ significantly in ways that could potentially identify areas for intervention and capacity 
building.  
 
Figure 3: Municipal Responsiveness to Mobility in Lephalale 
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In Lephalale, the overall capacity of the municipality is strong, given its context as a highly 
rural locality undergoing rapid changes. Because the context is rural, and because economic 
growth is heavily driven by the mining industry, both the availability and use of data are 
strong. Of the five indicators developed on data collection, four have been met. Spatialised 
data is available, and used by skilled officials. However, they are not incentives for accurate 
data use; to the contrary, divergent interests within the municipality were pulling data in 
different directions. While data collection in the municipality was not entirely unproblematic 
(for example, most data used by the municipality was coming from private sources, while 
centralised government agencies like the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) used 
data from Statistics South Africa), this is not a barrier in the municipality’s effectiveness to 
respond to migration. Similarly, while the budgeting process has some shortcomings, it is 
largely taking place in a way that is functional and transparent. While it may not promote the 
inclusion of migrants, or be using the potential of migration for economic development, it is 
also not a key stumbling block.  
 
Where the municipality falls short, however, is on the metrics related to accountability; 
specifically participation, and downward accountability. It scored only one of five in this 
area. Neither systems of resource allocation nor targets for service provision work in such a 
way that is inclusive of the needs of migrants. Not only is cooperation between government 
departments limited, competition and disagreements in certain areas was immobilising the 
delivery of public goods. It is clear that the municipality’s processes and structures of 
community consultation and engagement are preventing it from successfully responding to 
mobility.  
 
Similarly, low scores for both social cohesion and participation point to an inability in the 
municipality to bring the community together meaningfully. Lephalale scored only two in 
terms of both participation and social cohesion. Social cohesion was not achieved because, 
while the municipality does see its role in coordinating cohesion among residents, it has 
largely failed to do so, in terms of any practical programming, or even sophisticated analysis 
about the causes of conflict. In fact, political party conflict was a leading driver of conflict in 
the municipality, meaning the municipality itself occasionally played an antagonistic role of 
social cohesion.  
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Figure 4: Municipal Responsiveness to Mobility in Bushbuckridge 
 
The above figure illustrates the limited municipal capacity in Bushbuckridge. Without any 
meaningful sources of municipal revenue, and without the capacity to use data effectively, 
data use for budgeting and planning is poor. A quote on population dynamics taken from the 
IDP demonstrates the gaps that exist in using data effectively:  
 
The population of Bushbuckridge Local municipality was 545 811 according to the 
Statistics South Africa 1996 Census, then the 2001 census shows that there was 
decrease to 500,128 in population. There was an increase in population in the 2011 
census as the number rose to 541,248. Contributing factors might be the fertility and 
mortality rates, migration and influx to increase residential and business development 
in the municipality as a result of neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. A further research on life expectancy, mortality rate and other factors need 
to be conducted.  
 
This is in spite of Bushbuckridge having several advantages over the ‘typical’ South African 
municipality on data gathering, due to the presence of several rural research institutions 
that bring in a range of data at the municipal level.  
  
While Bushbuckridge only fulfilled one indicator on data collection and usage, it did 
somewhat better on the dimension of participation. While there are still problems of bias in 
municipal planning towards the needs of specific residents, the municipality has certainly 
taken on board the needs of marginalised communities within the municipality, and made 
efforts to extend services to people who may not have access.  
While Bushbuckridge has an official policy to support social integration, its score of 2 in 
terms of social cohesion indicates that there is still progress to be made. While the 
municipality accepts social cohesion as something within their remit, the other structures for 
addressing it are not in place. For example, there is neither a plan in place to address the 
issue, nor is there a shared analysis. 
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Similarly, on participation, its ‘3’ score reflects that the municipality is aware of how to 
facilitate participation, and that certain participatory processes were being followed. 
However, it also points to gaps. On public service delivery, deliberate and active efforts have 
been made to reach people who are inaccessible, or who may have difficulty accessing a 
town-based programme. However, there are still major gaps, ranging from the explicit 
exclusion of some people in engagement with the municipality to a lack of engagement with 
certain stakeholders.  
  
In this context, the municipality is not clear on its roles and responsibilities, nor does it see 
how mobility could fit into its mandate. These are significant inhibitors not only to 
responding to a mobile population, but to delivering services to all inhabitants. However, 
where Bushbuckridge scores somewhat better is on the dimensions related to participation 
and accountability. While both Lephalale and Bushbuckridge faced challenges to a local, 
downwardly accountability system, Bushbuckridge has more inclusive democratic structures 
in place. Such findings are likely to be apparent to anyone who visited both municipalities. In 
Bushbuckridge, there is not only a central municipal office that can be walked into freely, but 
there are over ten service delivery and outreach centres across the municipal area, which 
engage with citizens on questions and concerns. In Lephalale, however, there is heavy 
security before even gaining access to the municipal building; citizens are not free to walk in 
with queries. On the other side of security, doors are locked, and an ‘enquiries’ desk is not 
attended. While there are many ways in which Lephalale works more efficiently, it does so in 
a less open way.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Local governments around the world face multiple challenges to responding effectively to 
mobility, and building migration into their planning processes. If nothing else, our research 
demonstrates that the ability to build cohesive, prosperous and secure communities in this 
era requires municipalities to engage with issues of human mobility. Although this may 
require municipal authorities to rethink how they work, it is not an additional task, but 
rather part of their already challenging mandate to improve the lives of their constituencies. 
Failure to proactively address migration and other forms of human mobility will yield 
undesired consequences for all: social fragmentation, economic exclusion, poor planning, 
and the possibility of protest and violence. If properly managed, domestic migration can 
bring people closer to services, enrich the labour market, and open important opportunities 
for poverty reduction. Similarly, international migration need not lead to conflict, tensions 
and service shortfalls, but can help to provide needed skills and entrepreneurial energy, 
while boosting regional trade and integration and helping to facilitate post-conflict 
reconstruction in international migrants’ countries of origin.  
  
Migration and other forms of human mobility are by definition deeply spatialised processes. 
People move from one specific place to another, either within a municipality or into another 
municipality. As such, local governments have significant roles to play to effectively manage 
migration. To do this, we need to expand the tools available to guide municipalities and 
public authorities more generally on approaches to human mobility. The explanations and 
diagnostic tools included in this document are intended to help address this need. Although 
they do not outline how reforms and improved strategies may be realised, they help draw 
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attention to areas where municipalities are doing well, where they are doing poorly, and to 
some of the political and institutional structures which account for their performance. Only 
once these have been clearly articulated can we hope to achieve durable improvements in 
municipal management.  
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